The Darfur armed conflict, which is still ongoing between Sudanese armed forces, their affiliated militia and various rebels (some of whom receive external support), has inflicted unspeakable consequences upon civilians, their villages, towns, homes and other civilian objects-in particular relief assistance. The international community, including Sudan, has made, and is still making, albeit slowly, various efforts to secure peace and to stop violations of humanitarian principles in Darfur, including the controversial referral of some criminal cases to the ICC (which led to the indictment of the president of Sudan and the first head of state to be so) and the deployment of peacekeepers/enforcers which constitute the main features of the responses. Scholarly focus has been on the criminal side of the issue. This article deals with international humanitarian law (IHL) rules relating to the protection of civilians and civilian objects in the conflict. It examines the nature of the conflict, the applicable rules and compliance with those rules and the weakness and strengths, if any, of the responses of the international community in providing physical protection to civilians and their objects. It is argued that while the primary responsibility to stop violating civilian immunity rests on the warring parties there, and the regional approach to prevent widespread IHL violations in Darfur may have some obvious advantages, the erga omnes nature of the concerns at issue necessitates a concerted, adequate and timely global action to prevent further atrocities on the ground. The paper concludes with some suggestions which may help further prevent/mitigate armed violence against civilians.
Introduction
The armed conflict in Darfur (Eastern Sudan) was started in April 2003 by the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A led by Mini Minawi) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM led by Khalil Ebrahim) claiming to represent the black Darfurians on the one hand, and the Government of Sudan and the Arab militia called the Janjaweed (under the command of Ali Koysheb), on the other.
1 Later, the war spilled over into neighbouring provinces, in
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Countries such as the USA and UK, 7 and human rights and pacifist groups, for example, Amnesty International, 8 Human Rights Watch 9 and the International Crisis Group (ICG) welcome the decision. The ICG submitted that 'for the millions of Darfur victims of the conflict, this landmark decision provides independent legal recognition of the massive crimes committed against them '. 10 Moreover, the SLM-Minawi and JEM rebel groups (of Darfur) supported the indictment; the latter considered it as a 'victory for international law' and called upon the President to resign; while the southern Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLM) spoke 'about the dangers posed by Bashir's indictment to the stability of the country'.
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The relevant legal implications of this development on the subject of this paper will be considered further.
In spite of this recent phenomenon and the controversies it has triggered, the measures and the attention given to Darfur have generally been criticized for the lack of commitment, delays and inadequacy. For instance, the SC's first resolution on Darfur was adopted in July 2004, that is one year after the war had begun, which was similar to that of the response of the SC to the Rwandan genocide.
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This paper examines the international humanitarian law (IHL), also called jus in bello, aspects of the Darfur problem, with the emphasis on the duty to respect and protect civilians and civilian objects (which embraces humanitarian aid), and will ask: first, how and to what extent IHL applies to the situation? Second, what are the main legal obligations of the parties to the conflict vis-à-vis the civilian population? Third, how is compliance with such norms on the ground by both government and rebel forces? And finally, what is the response of the international community, which includes Sudan, in respect of providing physical protection to civilians and their objects?
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Protocols of 1977 and customary international law. 13 Four core principles summarize the salient features of IHL. The first concerns the protection of civilians (alongside their civilian objects) during armed conflict, also called the rule of distinction between combatants and civilians; 14 civilians being protected subject to not taking a direct part in hostilities. 15 The nature and extent of the protection have been explained by Sandoz et al.:
The danger arising from military operations. This means that the obligation does not consist only in abstaining from attacks, but also in avoiding, or in any case reducing to a minimum, incidental losses, and in taking safety measures. 16 Moreover, women and children, especially those who have been affected by war, have been given special protection; for example, warring parties are obliged not to recruit children under 15 years of age and to prevent them from taking part in hostility. 17 The second principle underlines that the purpose of war is to defeat an adversary, with minimum human and resource losses, rather than total destruction and extermination. 18 By so doing, IHL provides protection for combatants and civilians and embodies the principles of proportionality and necessity in its ambit. The third principle concerns the limitation on means and methods of warfare; weapons that cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury on human beings such as poison gases must not be used in warfare (this rule requires adherence to the notion of humanity in armed conflict) 19 and again, certain methods of warfare
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41 such as perfidious attacks upon an enemy have been prohibited. 20 Finally, when a gap in the law occurs relating to armed conflict, the principle of humanity and the dictates of public conscience apply. This and similar rules have been widely accepted in conventions. 21 The extent of application of these and other jus in bello norms in general and their detailed regulation in particular varies according to the nature of armed conflicts. While a war between states 'through the medium of their armed forces' 22 is considered as an international armed conflict, a war within the territory of a state 'between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups' 23 is deemed to be a non-international conflict. This means that, on the one hand, the whole regime of IHL, including the four Geneva Conventions and Geneva Protocol I, is applicable to international armed conflict (of course to states parties to these treaties) 24 and, on the other hand, Common Article 3 of the Conventions sets out the minimum IHL protections applicable during non-international armed conflict. The Article prohibits, inter alia, the following acts: 20 HC IV, Annex, Hague Regulations, Art. 24; GP I, Art. 37(2); see also Z. Yihdego, op. cit., fn. 18, p. 197. 21 See e.g. HC IV, preamble, para. 7; see for commentaries T. 23 See GP II Art. 1(2); the difference between internal security problems (riots, disturbances, etc.) and internal armed conflict is that the latter considers, inter alia, the following indicators: (a) political motive (power), (b) control of territory, (c) complete breakdown of law and order (which takes into account intensity of military operations, use of heavy weapons, etc.), (d) recognition of belligerency, (e) UN involvement (in particular the SC) and (f) the declaration or agreement by the parties to respect IHL. 24 This means that the notion of grave breaches and the universal obligation to prosecute or extradite offenders of such crimes, prisoners of war and the wide-ranging protections provided by the fourth Geneva Convention (also called the Civilian Convention) to civilians only apply to international armed conflicts. Thus, civilians and other victims must be treated humanely, and acts such as torture and murder are absolutely prohibited-the list of prohibited acts under this article is not exhaustive. Geneva Protocol II (GP II) reinforces the notion of civilian protection. It is widely endorsed in the context of the second Protocol (which deals with non-international conflict) that 'a civilian is anyone who is not a member of the armed forces or of an organized armed group'. 25 Article 13(1), (2) and (3) of the Protocol provides civilian immunity (which includes a civilian person, property and honour as elaborated under Article 4 of the Protocol) to civilians during internal armed conflict. It is prohibited to kill civilians (Article 4). Deliberate attacks on civilians and their objects are also war crimes. The ICC Statute under Article 8(2)(c), (d) and (e) stipulates that 'serious violations of Common Article 3 of the GCs would amount to war crimes of the same severity as grave breaches'.
26
GP II has endorsed, even if ambiguously (compared with Article 58(c) of GP I), that 'the civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from military operations' (Article 13(1)), and so reflects the duty of taking all available measures of precaution during internal armed conflict.
Moreover, Article 14 of the Protocol proscribes launching attacks on 'objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population such as food-stuffs, agricultural areas'; it is therefore unlawful to starve 'civilians as a method of combat'. However, even if attacks are not meant to starve civilians, the requirements of proportionality and measures of precaution must be undertaken. Article 18(2) of the Protocol provides that, 'relief actions for the civilian population . . . shall be undertaken subject to the consent of the High Contracting Party concerned '. 27 This duty must be read in the light of relevant SC resolutions and various agreements entered into by parties to a conflict, and so the consent element may not be a bar to its application. Finally, forced 'displacement of civilians' is forbidden as a result of armed conflict, unless justified by the security of civilians and military necessity (Article 17). 
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Later developments supported the application of customary IHL norms to non-international armed conflict. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Tadic case expounded that the basic rules of IHL, including the rule of distinction (between combatants and civilians and military and non-military objectives) and the restriction on means and methods of war, apply to non-international armed conflict. Rogers agrees that 'the basic customary law principles of military necessity, humanity, distinction and proportionality . . . provide guidelines', and so bind all states whether or not they are parties to the GCs or GP II.
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While Greenwood noted such developments in the law during the 1990s and their reflection in the ICC Statute, he emphasized that these claims are based upon a 'somewhat creative approach to the law and some of its conclusions [of the ICTY as discussed above] are not easy to justify'. 29 There are some elements of truth in this doubt as the application of some of the principles of IHL to internal armed conflicts may be problematic (e.g. the combatant status of warring parties). Yet, though some criticize it as an ambitious project, the ICRC Study on Customary Humanitarian Law seriously challenged the distinction under consideration and narrowed down the traditional difference between the two types of armed conflicts in terms of applying the basic rules to both situations.
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What seems to be certain, however, is that those states who are involved in civil wars must comply with the basic (treaty and customary) rules of IHL. The notions of combatant and prisoner-of-war (PoW) status may well be applicable if the warring parties to a conflict agree to do so. However, the biggest difference between international and non-international armed conflict law is that in the latter, combatant and PoW status is not provided for and states have been very reluctant to accept such provision. The main reason for this is that internal wars occur within a state's territory, and domestic law regulates the behaviour of rebels-Article 3 of GP II, for example, refers to the non-intervention rule of 28 Similarly, the argument that 'armed opposition groups are bound by the rules governing internal armed conflict is beyond doubt'; 32 this is subject to (a) a group acting 'under responsible command', and (b), it exercising control 'over a part of its [a state's] territory', as stated in Article 1(1) of GP II. Their obligations can be derived from customary or treaty obligations. The latter may be the case when they expressly accept compliance with Common Article 3 and GP II. 33 Finally, IHL is binding on everybody in his/her personal capacity. 34 But the threshold for the application of Common Article 3 and AP II differs. While the latter does apply to 'all conflicts' except those 'covered by Article 1' of AP I, it only governs conflicts 'which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups', 35 What is certain, however, is that when the specific rules enshrined in the treaties at issue attain a customary status (including some of the provisions of AP II), the discussion on the differences between the types of internal conflicts becomes less important. These and other legal issues can only be properly understood with reference to specific situations and facts, which the next section endeavours to do. I shall also turn to some of these issues.
B. Applicability to Darfur
The implication of these issues (and ultimately the rules) to Darfur first and foremost relies on determining whether or not there is an armed conflict in Darfur. The ICTY in Tadic defined the existence of an armed conflict and the application of IHL as follows:
An armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between government authorities and organized armed groups within a state . . . international humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflict and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached . . . IHL continues to apply . . . in the whole territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place there. Zeray Yihdego determined the situation as 'a threat to international peace and security and to stability in the region' in general, the implications of which often serve as an endorsement of the existence of an armed conflict by the Council. While the Council's resolutions do not decisively determine the existence and nature of an armed conflict and the applicability of IHL, they may be of vital importance as evidence of those phenomena.
The UN Commission of Inquiry on Darfur specifically examined the question of determining the existence of an armed conflict in Darfur. The Commission, outlining the legal requirements for an armed conflict as discussed (Section 2(A)), focused on the nature and intensity of the conflict and the standing of the parties to the conflict. It noted that both the JEM and SLM/A, the main rebel groups, organized themselves to fight the Government of Sudan and 'spoke on behalf of all Darfurians, and mainly directed their attacks at government installations'. 39 While the initial military attacks targeted police stations and the like, 'the scale of rebel attacks increased noticeably in February 2003' (para. 75). It also noted that 'the rebels exercise de facto control over some areas of Darfur' (para. 75). The SLM/A was, and still is, active in north-west and south Darfur, while the JEM is mainly active in northern Darfur (paras 127, 133). In one instance, for example, the military operations of the rebels went as far as Khartoum and its outskirts.
Likewise, the government responded by involving its regular armed forces including the Sudanese air force, the Janjaweed militia and the PDF who had been 'recruited', 'organized', 'financed' and directed by the government (paras 98-115). These operations involved intensive aerial bombardment, complete destruction of villages and towns, and fierce fighting against rebel stronghold positions. For these and similar reasons, the Commission was rather explicit and stated that: the conflict . . . does not merely amount to a situation of internal disturbances and tensions, riots, or isolated and sporadic acts of violence. Rather, the requirements of (i) existence of organized armed groups fighting against the central authorities, (ii) control by rebels over part of the territory and (iii) protracted fighting, in order for this situation to be considered an internal armed conflict under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions are met. (para. 75) This may be challenged on two grounds: firstly, from the beginning, as indicated by the Commission (para. 55), the black movements and the Arab tribes were in conflict over resources-including land, grass, etc., and thus such sporadic attacks between Darfur tribes may be characterized as internal disturbance and violence which existed for some time in the region. This argument was entertained by the Government of Sudan, as we shall later see (para. 201). Secondly, later developments witnessed the fragmentation of rebel groups, the creation of new movements and widespread banditry in Darfur. It may well be argued thus that the government is taking law enforcement measures to control these factions and criminal elements (para. 78).
Despite the motives and purposes of the warring parties and the criminal activities there, however, the facts that the main rebel groups have been engaged in organized, planned and targeted military operations (including against air force and other military bases and government infrastructure), that their measures were mainly connected to each other, and that the government and its militia have been engaged in an intensive and prolonged military crackdown which led to colossal destruction of villages and towns and to the deaths and displacement of hundreds of thousands of people affirm the high intensity of the armed conflictand so does the validity of the Commission's conclusion on the issue. It has to be said that it is not necessary for the whole of Darfur (or for that matter Sudan) to be used as a field of military operations in order to establish an armed conflict and the application of IHL to the situation. For example, the ICTR in Prosecutor v. Akayesu underlined that in case of a non-international armed conflict, Common Article 3 to the GCs applies 'in the whole territory of the State engaged in the conflict '. 40 This is valid to Darfur/Sudan, although the most important rules applicable to hostilities are in areas of military engagement.
In a nutshell, the factual evidence (as related to the legal requirements) regarding the ongoing armed conflict in Darfur and in the region since 2003 (as endorsed by the international community and the parties to the conflict, as we shall discuss later), affirms the existence of an armed conflict and, thus, IHL applies to the conflict. The ICC's arrest warrant for the President of Sudan assumes this. Yet the search for answers to questions relating to the extent of the application of IHL to Darfur does not seem to be straightforward. Solutions may be found in examining the characteristics of the conflict.
A threefold argument can be put forward here: The first is that the Darfur conflict is an international armed conflict. There are two dimensions to this question. The first is whether or not there was/is a direct armed hostility between Chad and Sudan. Common Article 2 to the GCs provides that the Conventions 'shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them'. 41 In the present case, international organisations, publicists and media reports have highlighted the regional dimension of the conflict. The Secretary-General's report of February 2008 submitted that 40 Prosecutor v Akayesu (Trial judgment) ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) para. 635; the tribunal has also noted that the application of all rules may not be the same in all parts of a territory; see also 
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Zeray Yihdego 'Chadian regular armed forces and the JEM launched several attacks inside Sudanese territory'. 42 Moreover, 'both countries accused each other of using rebels to launch proxy attacks on their capitals last year'. 43 Both countries deny these allegations including the allegation made by the UN.
It may well be that the incursion of Chadian armed forces into Darfur and their subsequent engagement in military operations met the requirements of Common Article 2 of the GCs. It must be mentioned that the Chadian air force also conducted air raids in Darfur. Dinstein, for example, submitted that IHL 'is brought to bear upon the conduct of hostilities between sovereign States, even if [the] hostilities fall short of war, namely, constitute a mere incident'. 44 While the involvement of Chadian troops seems to be more than an incident, the fact that their main target was Chadian rebels 45 and that there appears no evidence that they fought against the Sudanese armed or irregular forces there does undermine the argument in favour of the existence of an international armed conflict between the two countries. There was no plan (or an agenda) of occupation either. Even if there was such an armed conflict for a brief period between December 2007 and early January 2008 (as can be inferred from the UN Report of February 2008) involving Chadian troops in the territory of the Sudan, it may be said that it had ceased when the troops withdrew from the Darfur region.
The second dimension leads one to raise (irrespective of the direct engagement of Chadian troops in Darfur) the question of whether Chad is in overall control of any of the militias, which may thus constitute an armed conflict between Chad and Sudan. The UN Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations Mr. Jean-Marie Guehenno, in his February 2008 report to the SC, said as follows: 46 The potentially destabilizing regional implications of the crisis have been highlighted by numerous media reports of Chadian rebel movements receiving support in the Sudan, on the one hand, and Sudanese rebel movements that have acted in support of the Chadian Government, on the other hand. Continuing accusations by both Governments of their support for rebel movements on each side of the border increase the climate of mistrust, fuel tensions between the two countries and once again demonstrate the potential for a conflict of international dimension in the area. More specifically, Darfur rebels, the JEM in particular, have been receiving logistical, financial and similar support from the Government of President Deby of Chad (who is a Zaghawan tribe member, the same as the JEM leaders/rebels). JEM leaders were also operating from N'Djamena and their forces, accompanied by Chadian military forces, were deployed. 49 However, the help and extent of support to the rebels has varied due to the ups and downs of the peace agreements and diplomatic relations between the two countries. As a result, for example, in 2007 'many Darfur rebels left Chad' and some of them were 'briefly arrested' in N'Djamena. 50 With such uncertainty, it is difficult to establish 'effective control' (a test set out in the Nicaragua case) of Chad over the rebels and their operations.
The ICJ in the Nicaragua case, while acknowledging the US' provision of logistics, finance and weapons to the Contra, concluded that this did not prove that the USA was directing, commanding and effectively controlling the operations of the Contra. 51 If one tries to compare the level of intervention of the USA in Nicaragua with Chad's intervention in Sudan, it seems difficult to see or claim 'effective control' of Chad over the rebels. As mentioned earlier, the latter have territorial control over some parts of Darfur, they have their own leadership and they appear to carry on their military business even when their relationship with Chad deteriorates.
Although the details of this are not within the realms of this paper, however, the fact that foreign troops have been deployed as peace enforcers (with Chapter VII enforcement powers) may underpin the position that the conflict is not an internal armed conflict. These forces are bound by IHL norms in their conduct of operations; 52 although whether their presence in a civil war situation can 47 This will be specifically considered with reference to the UN mission(s) in Darfur.
With this emphasis and reading of the situation and if one is content with the argument that the main feature of the conflict is international (involving two states, militaries and territories), then the entire IHL regime would be applicable to the conflict.
However, since Chad and Sudan do not seem (in spite of instances of accusation and counter-accusation of aggression and intervention 54 ) to be in a state of (declared or undeclared) armed conflict and the salient features of the Darfur conflict are of a civil war nature, it can persuasively be argued that it is not an inter-state war and so it is subject to Common Article 3 of the Conventions and GP II obligations (for Sudan's treaty obligations, see Section 3). The UN treatment of the conflict by and large reflects this position. 55 The UN Commission of Inquiry determined the conflict as an internal war by stating as follows: It also emphasized that the requirements of Common Article 3, namely, organized armed groups (fighting the government of Sudan), persistent and protracted fighting, and the control of some parts of territory by the groups are met (para. 74).
What is interesting, however, is that the Commission considered not only the regular armed forces of Sudan but also the Janjaweed militia and others as 111) . The Commission also noted that the parties to the conflict agree on the internal nature of the armed conflict (para. 76), although the Sudanese Government consistently maintained the view that the 'conflict is tribal' which must be resolved 'through traditional reconciliation' methods (para. 201), to which I will return. Later SC resolutions focused on the internal aspects rather than external factors. SC Res 1591 of 2005, for example, determined the situation as 'a threat to international peace' without a mention of 'regional stability', and acting under Chapter VII, condemned both parties to the conflict, the Government and rebels, inter alia, for continuing military confrontation. 56 The UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, after his recent return from Darfur, while touching upon the regional aspect of the problem, braced this approach, by stating as follows: 57 We speak often and easily about Darfur. But what can we say with surety? By conventional shorthand, it is a society at war with itself. Rebels battle the government; the government battles the rebels. Yet the reality is more complicated. Lately, the fighting often as not pits tribe against tribe, warlord against warlord.
Therefore, unless one can clearly distinguish the Chad-Sudan conflict from that of the internal conflict in Darfur similar to what the ICTY 58 did in characterizing the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, in terms of the timeline of the war, and as expressly conceded by the UN Commission of Inquiry, the conflict is predominantly a civil war and so subject to the rules applicable to the internal armed conflict. Further evidence would be that Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC relied on Article 8(2)(e) of the ICC Statute, which concerns 'other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character', in issuing a warrant for Mr. Bashir's arrest. The conflict between the contras' forces and those of the Government of Nicaragua is an armed conflict which is "not of an international character". The acts of the contras towards the Nicaraguan Government are therefore governed by the law applicable to conflicts of that character; whereas the actions of the United States in and against Nicaragua fall under the legal rules relating to international conflicts. Because the minimum rules applicable to international and to non-international conflicts are identical, there is no need to address the question whether those actions must be looked at in the context of the rules which operate for the one or for the other category of conflict. The relevant principles are to be looked for in the provisions of Article 3 of each of the four Conventions of 12 August 1949, the text of which, identical in each Convention, expressly refers to conflicts not having an international character. (para. 219)
The Court seemed to differentiate the war (and the applicable law) between Nicaragua and the USA from that of the conflict between the Contra and the Government of Nicaragua. However, it emphasized the identical nature of the minimum IHL standards applicable to both types of conflicts-it can be said that the threshold which was referred to by the ICJ is valid for Darfur also. Yet, the Nicaragua case seems to be different from Darfur in that a foreign state was directly and indirectly involved as a main actor in the war (as clearly established by the world Court). It is not clear whether Chad is the main actor/participant in the Darfur situation.
The following points recapitulate the debate: firstly, although the Darfur conflict comprises elements of both types of conflicts, it is basically a civil war situation. Common Article 3 of the Conventions, GP II, and appropriate customary rules apply, 61 the specific and most relevant rules will be elaborated subsequently; secondly, in terms of applying the fundamentals of IHL (e.g. rules of distinction, humanity, proportionality and necessity) to an armed conflict, the difference between the two types of conflicts arguably lacks real substance, although there are differences on the extent of the protection and application of the rules at issue; finally, even if the conflict is a mix of both, the interest here is to look at the specific duties of the internal parties and their compliance therewith. 
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Specific Duties and Questions of Compliance
A. The Parties and Their Specific Duties
In order to comprehend properly the duties and compliance with them, a brief re-mention of the parties to the conflict is imperative. The parties can broadly be categorized into two: the Sudanese armed forces (including the Popular Defence Forces and the 'Borders Intelligence') and the Janjaweed militia, 62 on the one hand, and the rebels, mainly the SLM, JEM (and the National Movement for Reform and Development [NMRD]), on the other. All factions and 'bandits' of Darfur 63 may not necessarily qualify as parties to the conflict for purposes of IHL, as they do not seem to satisfy the aforementioned requirements.
The forces in the first cluster must respect the laws and customs of war applicable to this internal armed conflict for the simple reason that Sudan has been a party to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 since 1957 and to GP II since (7 July) 2006. While the obligations of Common Article 3 are applicable to the conflict (both as a matter of treaty obligation and customary law) from day one, GP II has only been applicable (as a treaty obligation) to Darfur since 2006. GP II is also binding on rebels and individuals from their entry into force for Sudan (Article 23).
However, the parties in both clusters (including the rebels and individuals) must respect the provisions of the Protocol and other duties which reflect customary law. At least three relevant areas/obligations can be identified here: Firstly, indiscriminate attacks against Darfur civilians, bombardment of cities, towns, villages 'or other areas containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects' 64 (as enshrined in Article 13(2)) are customary bans. Secondly, it is generally accepted that attacking objects used for 'humanitarian relief operations' and 'humanitarian relief personnel' are prohibited; the former is a 'corollary of the prohibition of starvation' as a deliberate method of war and the protection of civilian objects. The personnel involved in such efforts are civilians and thus not legitimate targets of military attack. 65 And finally, peacekeepers (and not peace enforcers) are not a party to a conflict and therefore enjoy the protection 54 Zeray Yihdego provided for civilians. It is well established that killing a peacekeeper is a war crime even in internal armed conflict. 66 It is interesting to note that 'in 2004 the two rebel groups and the Government of the Sudan entered into a number of international agreements, inter se, in which they invoke or rely upon the Geneva Conventions'. 67 In particular, the Protocol on the Establishment of Humanitarian Assistance in Darfur, signed on 8 April 2004 by the Government of the Sudan with the SLA and JEM, referred to the commitment of the parties to the provision of humanitarian assistance in Darfur in accordance with international rules, including GP II(2).
It can also be said (though not the main issue here) that both sides to the conflict in Darfur, unlike the South-North divide in Sudan, are Muslims and, therefore, subject to Islamic rules of warfare. Al-Zuhili, underlining the legitimacy, inter alia, of wars of 'self-defence' and 'assistance for the victims of injustice' in Islam, has referred to the decree (of 632-634) of the first Caliph of Islam, Abu Bakr, issued to his commander: 68 I prescribe ten commandments to you: do not kill a woman, a child, or an old man, do not cut down fruitful trees, do not destroy inhabited areas, do not slaughter any sheep, cow or camel except for food, do not burn date palms, nor inundate them, do not embezzle (commit ghulul), not be guilty of cowardliness.
This reference may be useful in terms of preventing violations of humanitarian norms in the region; reference to rules of Islam may well be more easily understood and received than IHL (or human rights) treaties which may be perceived as 'inventions' of, and 'impositions' from, western civilization.
Because of these treaty and customary law-based duties, as endorsed by the parties, government forces, their affiliated militia, the rebels (who satisfy the aforesaid conditions) and individuals in Darfur must, as a minimum, respect and protect the basic rules and customs of war.
of obtaining permission of the party in whose territory the relief action will be conducted'. 66 
B. Questions of Compliance
Breaches of IHL rules are regrettably widespread in Darfur, the details of which can be traced from various credible sources and reports. While denouncing the alleged genocide by the Government of Sudan in Darfur during the initial years of the conflict (2002) (2003) (2004) , the UN Commission of Inquiry:
finds that in many instances Government forces and militias under their control attacked civilians and destroyed and burned down villages in Darfur contrary to the relevant principles and rules of international humanitarian law . . .. In addition, it appears that such attacks were also intended to spread terror among civilians so as to compel them to flee the villages.
(para. 631)
The Sudanese Government denied this, and other similar assertions of systematic breaches of humanitarian law for several reasons: First, the atrocities were committed by the rebels, and not by government forces as a result of the tribal conflict there. And second, the armed forces reacted to maintain law and order and their targets were the rebels and not civilians (paras 205, 249). However The rebels denied these allegations and blamed the government and the Janjaweed for the violations; for instance, JEM affirmed to the Commission that 'its internal regulation contained strong commitment' to IHL and the protection of civilians (paras 218-19). The Report is much more critical of the government than the rebels on the issue of deliberate attacks against the civilian population; however, the killing of humanitarian workers as civilians was generally attributed to the rebels, to the new rebel movement called NMRD in particular (paras 289-90).
Moreover, other crucial violations which are alleged to have been perpetrated mainly by government forces and the Janjaweed militia included: the failure to take precautionary measures in military engagement when civilians and civilian targets are at risk (paras 262-66), forcible transfer of civilians and abuses in IDP ' (para. 193 ). The salient features of acts 'committed' by the Janjaweed seemed to focus on widespread rapes, pillages, burning villages and civilian objects, etc., while indiscriminate air bombardment and the likes 'featured' the actions of the regular armed forces of Sudan.
The credibility of these findings can be inferred not only from the legal, forensic, military and investigative expertise of members of the team, but also from the extensive investigation conducted on the ground and the diverse sources of information gathered in the process.
During its presence in the Sudan, the Commission held extensive meetings with representatives of the Government, the Governors of the Darfur States and other senior officials in the capital and at provincial and local levels, members of the armed forces and police, leaders of rebel forces, tribal leaders, internally displaced persons, victims and witnesses of violations, NGOs and United Nations representatives. (Executive Summary, para. 4) Given the scale of violations and the complexity of the situation, the time, budget and expertise constraints of the Commission (it was only mandated for three months and its budget was not enough to hire more than 13 experts [para. 18]), it has to be underlined, as stated in the Report, that 'the Commission has been able to take a first step towards accountability' (para. 19).
Be that as it may, the findings (in respect of breaches) have been endorsed by the UN 72 and others, which led to the referral 73 of the case by the SC to the ICC 70 Ibid., paras 322-31; for the obligations relating to IDPs, see K. Hulm, op. cit., fn. 26, p. 91. 71 The Commission (op. cit., fn. 39, para. 305) found that 'many of the villages were reportedly completely destroyed by deliberate demolition of structures and more frequently by burning down the whole village. Straw roofs of the traditional circular houses were torched, as well as all other inflammable material, and vegetation inside and in the immediate vicinity of the village was destroyed by burning. Some of these villages had hundreds of homes that were torched and burnt to the ground. During the attacks Janjaweed are reported to have destroyed utensils, equipment for processing food, water containers and other household items essential for the survival of the inhabitants'. 
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in accordance with the recommendation of the Commission (para. 569). Indeed, serious violations occurred in the first two-to three-year period of the conflict by government forces, the Janjaweed and the rebels, the details of which have been well articulated by the Inquiry Commission. Contrary to what some hoped for, 74 however, the Commission's work and subsequent referral of cases to the ICC do not seem to have stopped or even mitigated the violence against civilians. For instance, the February 2008 Report of the UN Secretary-General to the SC expressed serious concern over the hostilities between Government forces and JEM-Khalil Ibrahim rebels, and strongly condemned: The Government claimed that the operations were aimed at rooting out the JEM forces from the area, while the latter alleged that the actions of Government targeted civilians. 76 The ICC prosecutor told the SC in June 2008 that 'the entire Darfur region is a crime scene', and 'evidence shows an organized campaign by Sudanese officials to attack civilians'. While Libya thought that such labelling of Sudanese officials is mainly based on 'media and political reports', other members of the Council have basically agreed with the Prosecutor. China's representative 'reaffirmed his Government's condemnation of crimes against civilians'.
77
Those civilians who sought refuge in IDP camps are not safe from violence either. The November 2007 Report of the International Crisis Group explained the situation in the camps around Zalingei stating that 'twenty assassinations or attempted assassinations (pitting suspected rebel sympathizers against suspected government sympathizers) were reported; an IDP suspected of working for the national security agency was shot; guns have been fired at; the deputy sheikh was 78 These occurred over a period of six months or so. In addition, an IDP from Zamzam camp reported in October 2008 that 'four vehicles entered the camp filled with men wearing police khaki uniforms . . . and started shooting . . .. They shot me in the back before I got the chance to escape'. 79 Government forces (in particular the Janjaweed) are often blamed for such actions, 80 although the rebels are also implicated in similar violations. The SLM/A (mostly from the Fur and Massaleit tribes), for instance, 'committed so many atrocities that it became known locally as the "Janjaweed" II'; and this continued in 2007. 81 As reported by the UN SC Monitoring Panel on Sudan, moreover, 'the increased attacks against humanitarian personnel and vehicles have frustrated delivery of humanitarian assistance'. 82 This may well constitute a breach of IHL for three main reasons. First, such military attacks are contrary to the prohibition of targeting civilians and civilian objects; and second, starvation of the civilian population (by obstructing relief assistance) appears to be prohibited if they are intentionally used as a method of warfare; and third, if such objects are attacked contrary to the requirements of proportionality and precautionary measures, they would be in violation of IHL duties, regardless of whether they are purported to starve civilians or not. The UN spokesperson, Michele Montas, expressed concern in September over 'military bombardments and attacks on aid workers' and added that 'the cut in aid compromises the health and well-being of numerous towns and villages and affects up to 450 000 people'. 83 In the early years of the conflict such acts were said to have been committed by rebels; 84 85 the implications of which raise serious questions of compliance of the parties with the rules at issue. However, it is not clear whether this is done deliberately for starvation purposes or whether people are just helping themselves to these supplies. It is also not clear whether the parties engaged in such attacks have complied with the proportionality and precautionary rules either.
Peacekeepers (and peace enforcers) and their convoys have also been subjected to military attacks by the parties to the conflict. Attacks against the personnel of the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) 'have been numerous and deadly in 2007'; 21 soldiers have been killed, others have been wounded and vehicles, weapons and ammunition have been taken. It seems that these are mainly acts of rebels (both the signatories to the peace process such as SLA and JEM and other groups), although the Mission does not normally determine responsibility. Some think that the reason for such attacks is related to frustration and mistrust of AMIS on the part of the various rebels. 86 Similarly, 'on 7 January This situation raises a twofold legal problem. The first one concerns the protection provided for peacekeepers vis-à-vis peace enforcement personnel. Under IHL, attacks on AMIS 88 personnel amount to attacks on civilians, while attacks 60 Zeray Yihdego against UNAMID 89 personnel may not necessarily be so as the latter is specifically mandated with enforcement powers and so may be a legitimate target of combat, and entitled to 'rights of a belligerent'.
90 It has to be noted (though the details are not within the scope of this work) that any action against (or for that matter by) UNAMID personnel must be in compliance with the rules of IHL 91 (in particular, the rules of necessity, humanity and proportionality) the contraventions of which may constitute war crimes.
Moreover, the 1994 Convention on the Safety of the United Nations and Associated Personnel provides protections for UN peacekeepers including those deployed under Chapter VII such as UNAMID (to a civil war situation), unless they 'are engaged as combatants against organized armed forces and to which the law of international armed conflict applies'. 92 Article 7(1), for example, imposes a duty upon states (the host state in particular) to ensure that 'United Nations and associated personnel, and their equipment and premises shall not be made the object of attack or of any action that prevents them from discharging their mandate'. In principle, hence, UNAMID personnel (that embraces military, police and civilian units) must enjoy these and similar protections, as they are not in any sense engaged in combat with organized military forces there. But Sudan is not a party to the 1994 Convention, despite the fact that it signed 'the Status of Forces Agreement' with the UN/AU for the deployment of UNAMID on 10 February 2008. 93 The second and probably the most serious challenge is that the assaults against aid workers, aid convoys, peacekeepers and even civilians in IDP camps by rebel groups and bandits have increased. Determining the identities of the attackers has become difficult due to the proliferation and fragmentation of the movements there. The SLA-Mini Minawi has splintered into nearly five groupings, while JEM has suffered perhaps fewer but, nevertheless, similar splinters. 96 That is why the requirement for combatants to distinguish themselves from civilians is so important.
This challenge (and the developments therein) obviously affects the efforts to protect humanitarian norms in Darfur. The proliferation and fragmentation of rebel groups and their respective leadership would mean that determining command and hierarchy (in effect the application of IHL to their operations) within each rebel group becomes blurred. Another aspect of this problem is that it would be difficult to identify who does what in their own respective localities and areas of movement. It may be assumed that the signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement (as recognized by Sudan, the UN, AU and other regional actors) as parties to the conflict have expressed commitment to abide by IHL (including not to attack aid workers, peacekeepers and civilians) and, therefore, the crimes are committed by non-signatory rebels or bandits. However, some reports in fact indicate the commission of grave violations by DPA signatories. The SLA/M factions of Mini Minawi rebels 'have been responsible for attacks on civilians, humanitarians, the AU mission [AMIS] and some of the violence in the . . . IDP camps' (ICG, 2007, i) .
In short, the Sudanese Government and Darfur rebels have unambiguous duties to protect the civilian population and civilian objects, including aid workers, peacekeepers and humanitarian aid during the conflict. The latter has an aspect on the prohibition of starvation of a population during the conflict. In spite of denials and accusation and counter-accusation from both sides, the violations are apparent and are of a serious nature. Breaches by the government armed forces involved indiscriminately attacking villages and towns, 97 mostly during military engagement. The ICC, in the Al-Bashir case referred, for example, to 'two counts of war crimes: intentionally directing attacks against a civilian group, and the Khamees Abdallah (later formed National Redemption Front Coalition in Asmara) group; similarly, the Darfur Independent Front, JEM-Eastern Command, JEM-Collective Leadership, the Shahama Movement, etc., emerged from JEM in defiance of Khalil Ebrahim's leadership. 95 
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Zeray Yihdego indiscriminate attacks on civilians', and acting under Chapter VII, endorsed 'the deployment of international monitors, including the protection force' of the African Union to Darfur 'under the leadership' of the AU. The Resolution emphasized that the deployment of peacekeepers will be from African countries, while the international community was also urged to support the process (in material and financial terms). This led to the deployment of AMIS to Darfur, the initial mandate of which was only to monitor the humanitarian ceasefire and the protection of its monitors. This operation was terribly under-resourced in both human and logistical terms and, therefore, was not able to protect AMIS personnel let alone Darfur civilians from violent and indiscriminate attacks.
111
This led to the Council taking further measures, and later in 2006, it expanded the mandate of the United Nations Mission to Sudan (UNMIS) to Darfur, which was initially deployed in 2005, to oversee the North-South peace process. 112 Unlike AMIS, UNMIS was empowered, inter alia, to facilitate humanitarian aid in Darfur; to support the AU mission; and most importantly to use force in defence of its personnel and 'without prejudice to the responsibility of the Sudanese Government, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence'. 113 Again, UNMIS could not cope up with the dynamics of the conflict; not only was it fully mandated to defend the civilian population but also it was not fully deployed due to human and logistical constraints and, thus, was not an effective peacekeeping operation 114 -in fact, the murders of AMIS personnel occurred while UNMIS was deployed in Darfur.
Consequently, the Council, 'noting with strong concern ongoing attacks on the civilian population and humanitarian workers' (emphasis original), and the obstacles to humanitarian assistance, among other things, unanimously adopted Res. 1769 of 2007 to deploy the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UN-AMID). Based on Chapter VII, the Mission was authorized (a) 'to take the necessary action' subject to its area of deployment and its capabilities, (b) 'to ensure the security and freedom of movement of . . . humanitarian workers, and (c) to 'prevent the disruption' of the peace process and 'armed attacks, and protect civilians'-the caveat 'without prejudice to the responsibility of the Sudanese Government' was also reiterated. This mandate is much broader than the powers of UNMIS, and the Mission is now operational in around 55 locations of deployment in Darfur. 115 UNAMID has been making efforts to protect civilians and investigate military attacks against them. 116 In the early months of the Mission's deployment, the UN Special Envoy for Darfur held that: 117 The Mission is doing its utmost to adopt a more proactive a posture through increased presence, especially in internally displaced persons camps. To that end, the UNAMID Police Commissioner has dramatically increased the number of police patrols, which now take place from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m., and is constructing a number of police posts in those areas with a view to maintaining a 24-hour presence. The Force Commander is also exploring options for increasing the presence of forces in key areas.
Despite the commendable effort and commitment of peacekeepers and troops and other resources contributing countries, however, UNAMID is not yet effective in providing civilian security. For example, a cattle-herder in October (2008) told reporters that 'these peacekeepers . . . can't stop the government or those who attack us'.
118 It was also reported that: 119 In May (2008), when government police attacked the town of Tawila in North Darfur and its camp for the displaced-burning houses, looting the market and beating people-UNAMID did not intervene militarily, opting instead to try to pressure the government's police commander to stop the attack.
These and other similar occurrences are evidence of the helplessness of the Mission to protect civilians in Darfur. However, it is equally difficult to blame UN-AMID for each occurrence of this sort. For example, it is not clear whether UN-AMID is supposed to use force to protect civilians in the Tawila incident as the action involved policing rather than military action of the parties to the conflict. However, the Darfur (UN) Commission stated as follows:
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Normally, in an international armed conflict the civil police force does not formally take part in the hostilities and can, at least theoretically, be considered as a non-combatant benefiting from the safeguards and protections against attack. However, in the particular case of the internal conflict in Darfur, the distinction between the police and the armed forces is often blurred. There are strong elements indicating occurrences of the police fighting alongside Government forces during attacks or abstaining from preventing or investigating attacks on the civilian population committed by the Janjaweed. There are also widespread and confirmed allegations that some members of the Janjaweed have been incorporated into the police. President Al-Bashir confirmed in an interview with international media that in order to rein in the Janjaweed, they were incorporated in 'other areas', such as the armed forces and the police. Therefore, the Commission is of the opinion that the 'civilian' status of the police in the context of the conflict in Darfur is questionable.
120
It may well be that whenever the police forces take a direct part in armed hostility in Darfur, they forfeit their civilian status, and that the prevention of such attacks rests within the mandate of the Mission. 121 Clearly, UNAMID is essentially failing to meet its mandate (in particular, the protection of civilians) for three main reasons at least. Firstly, human and logistical constraints remain problems of the operation. The deployment of personnel is now only at a level of about 50% of the anticipated number. The mission suffers serious logistical hurdles including the absence of monitoring helicopters. local people, there seems to be a growing sense of frustration and mistrust for failing to provide security and protection. The UN Special Envoy for Darfur, in his call upon the international community to strengthen UNAMID, was honest in saying that 'the Mission will not be able to meet the high expectation of Darfur's civilians . . . this is particularly worrying since we risk losing their confidence if we are not able to meet those expectations'. 124 These are, and will be, failings of the international community indeed, although it is not too late to rectify them.
Conclusion
Many draw a parallel between the responses of the international community to Darfur and Rwanda and assert some identical failures including:
125 ' The issue of whether state sovereignty should deter international action, an emphasis on keeping an existing peace process on track and not confronting human rights abuses . . ., and a tardy and inadequate response to a crisis in Africa by the United Nations Security Council'. Clearly, actual and widespread attacks against civilians and their objects during armed conflict, as concerns of IHL, are beyond matters of state sovereignty. They are, and must be, concerns of the international community as a whole. This notion accommodates neither the exclusion of a state that has direct entitlement and responsibility to do something about such challenges nor the various excuses or disguises of third states not to discharge their international obligations. The inability of Sudan to arrest the situation is clear, although the government may (or may not) deserve credit for its recent measures. However, the inability of the international community to respond adequately to this crisis, in the context of offering multilateral protection to civilians, can be neither explained nor defended persuasively. The question to be asked here should certainly not be about bombing Sudan like the former Yugoslavia to end atrocities there. It must not be about unilateral humanitarian intervention either. Rather, why is UNAMID lacking the necessary human and logistical resources? How is the international community's engagement with the parties in addressing IHL issues in Darfur?
